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I. PROLOGUE: DIRTY HARRY, 1977
I didn't see Dirty Harry until my freshman year in college, in
1977, at a $1 Midnight Madness showing at the university center.
But it was a memorable event: a rowdy, college audience cheering
as one for the quintessential 1970s anti-hero hero, hard-bitten
Inspector Harry Callaghan of the San Francisco Police Depart-
ment, played by the squinting Clint Eastwood, as he did battle
with a truly evil serial killer/child-kidnapper-and with the up-
side-down, criminal-coddling legal system that freed this monster
to kill and terrorize more victims.
It would be dramatizing to say that this flick led me to law
school (and to my brief stint as a federal prosecutor), but one
scene does remain blazed in my memory twenty years later. In-
spector Callaghan-"Dirty Harry'--has agreed to carry the ran-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The reader should
be aware that Akhil Amar and I were accidental law school roommates at Yale in 1982-83
and argued frequently and vehemently about some of the very same issues discussed here.
Our disagreements remained friendly, however, and Professor Amar and I remain friends
today (despite our disagreements). Friendship does not keep me from taking potshots at
him in print, when he deserves them (as he does, to some extent, here). See, for example,
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Double Jeopardy Law After Akhil Amar: Some Civil Procedure
Analogies and Inquiries, 26 Cumb L Rev 23, 23 n 1 (1995). Our association, however, may
help explain why I find much to agree with in this book. I evidently have been a bad influ-
ence on him. See note 15.
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som to the kidnapper/killer/terrorist (known as "Scorpio") that
the softheads in the Department have decided to pay off. Harry
believes that Scorpio intends to kill his child kidnap victim any-
way (if he hasn't done so already). Harry grudgingly makes the
delivery, the deal goes down, but Scorpio decides to kill Harry off,
too. Harry barely escapes, managing to wound Scorpio severely
with a switchblade to the leg.
With time running out-the killer's ransom demand said
that the fourteen-year-old girl was buried alive, with oxygen
enough only until 3 A.M.-Harry tracks Scorpio to a hospital and
eventually to the football stadium basement where Scorpio lives.
Harry scales the fence, breaks into the caretaker's quarters and
finds the rifle that had been used in earlier murders. Scorpio,
alerted to Callaghan's presence, attempts to flee, hobbling across
the football field. When the stadium lights go on, Harry shoots
Scorpio in the other leg with his .44 magnum ("the most powerful
handgun in the world"). Scorpio is, by this point, unarmed. Harry
approaches, points his .44 at the thug's head and demands to
know where the kidnap victim is. Scorpio refuses, and cries for a
lawyer. ("I am entitled to a lawyer!") Harry then steps on the
thug's wounded leg with all his weight and demands again to
know where the little girl is. (Half the midnight college crowd
cheers; half groans audibly; everybody gasps.) Screaming in ag-
ony, crying out for his rights, and still begging for a lawyer, the
kidnapper finally reveals where the girl has been hidden-buried,
really-and the San Francisco Police Department shortly thereaf-
ter finds her body, dead.
That scene is painful, but the next one is perhaps equally
painful.' Inspector Callaghan has been called in to the DA's office:
DA: I've just been looking over your arrest report. Very un-
usual piece of police work. [Sardonically:] Really amaz-
ing.
HARRY: [Mistaking this for a compliment:] Yeah, well, I had
some luck.
DA: [Standing up:] You're lucky I'm not indicting you for as-
sault with intent to commit murder!
HARRY: [Squinting:] What?
DA: Where the hell does it say you've got a right to kick
down doors, torture suspects, deny medical attention
and legal counsel?! Where have you been?! Does Esco-
bedo ring a bell!? Miranda?! I mean you must have
heard of the Fourth Amendment! What I'm saying is
The dialogue is from my transcription of the video. Dirty Harry (Warner Bros 1971).
Bracketed stage directions, scene characterizations, and snide asides are mine.
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that man had rights.
HARRY: [Scowling:] Well I'm all broken up about that man's
rights.
DA: You should be. I've got news for you, Callaghan, as soon
as he's well enough to leave the hospital he walks!
HARRY: [Incredulous but calm:] What are you talking about?
DA: He's free!
HARRY: You're letting him go?
DA: We have to. We can't try him.
HARRY: And why is that?
DA: Because I'm not wasting half a million dollars of the
taxpayers' money on a trial we can't possibly win. The
problem is we don't have any evidence.
HARRY: Evidence? What the hell do you call that?! [gesturing to
the high-powered rifle he recovered from a locker in the
janitor's room underneath the stadium]
DA: I call it nothing, zero.
HARRY: Are you trying to tell me that ballistics can't match the
bullet up to this rifle?
DA: [Condescending and bitter:] It does not matter what bal-
listics can do. This rifle might make a nice souvenir, but
it's inadmissible as evidence.
HARRY: And who says that?
DA: It's the law.
HARRY: Well then the law is crazy!
DA: [Pause. Becomes schoolmarmish as he introduces a book-
ish-looking curmudgeon who has been sitting quietly in
the background:] This is Judge Bannerman of the ap-
pellate court. He also holds classes in constitutional law
at Berkeley. [I love that line "holds classes"] I've asked
him for an opinion. Your Honor?
JUDGE: [Matter of factly, with a scholarly air:] Well, in my opin-
ion the search of the suspect's quarters was illegal. Evi-
dence obtained thereby, such as that hunting rifle for in-
stance, is inadmissible in court. You should have gotten
a search warrant. I'm sorry, but it's that simple.
HARRY: [Squinting again:] Search warrant? A girl was dying!
DA: She was in fact dead, according to the medical report.
HARRY: But I didn't know that!
JUDGE: The court would have to recognize the police officer's le-
gitimate concern for the girl's life, but there is no way
they can possibly condone police torture. All evidence
concerning the girl, the suspect's confession, all physical
evidence, would have to be excluded.
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HARRY: There must be something you can get him on.
JUDGE: Without the evidence of the gun, and the girl, [scoff and
shake of the head from side to side] I couldn't convict him
of spitting on the sidewalk. Now the suspect's rights
were violated, under the Fourth and Fifth, and probably
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
HARRY: And Ann Mary Deacon? What about her rights? I mean
she's raped and left to die in a hole. Who speaks for her?
II. MAGNUM FORCE: AKHIL AMAR, 1997
Inspector Harry Callaghan was right: The law is crazy. I
thought so at the time I saw Dirty Harry (when I didn't have the
foggiest idea of what "Escobedo" was) and now, finally, twenty
years later, Professor Akhil Amar has explained why this intui-
tion was, and is, right. The Constitution, Amar argues-contrary
to virtually everybody writing in the field-emphatically does not
demand such an upside-down, two-wrongs-make-a-right, baby-
with-the-bathwater approach to what is misleadingly called "con-
stitutional" criminal procedure. Under Amar's powerfully argued
and relentlessly iconoclastic readings of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments, Scorpio can be tried and convicted before he
kills and terrorizes again.
The Fourth Amendment, by its plain terms, requires that
searches and seizures be reasonable, not that they all be pursu-
ant to warrants (which Amar shows were strongly disfavored
during the founding era). The amendment contemplates, where
this rule is violated, traditional tort-law remedies against officers
committing common law torts (Inspector Harry Callaghan com-
mitted a number of them), by removing the defense of "official
authority" where a search or seizure was unreasonable. The pres-
ence of a warrant is a strong argument for reasonableness, but
not an absolute one. The absence of a warrant takes away from
the officer the potential immunizing effect of a warrant for what
would otherwise be ordinary torts. For Amar, the amendment
might further contemplate, in modern times, equitable or even
criminal remedies directed against the offending officer (such as
the DA's allusion to the possibility of criminal prosecution for as-
sault). But the amendment never requires, of its own force, exclu-
sion of probative physical evidence. Thus, the rifle is admissible
evidence, along with anything else Harry found in Scorpio's room
(pp 1-45).
Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is a peculiarly trial-oriented, testimonial privilege
of a criminal defendant not to have his own utterances used
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against him at trial if those utterances were compelled (physi-
cally, psychologically, or by judicial process). But it does not re-
quire exclusion of reliable physical evidence-"fruits"--obtained
as a result of such (inadmissible) compelled utterances. Although
Amar accepts Miranda (somewhat inexplicably-a point I will
develop at length presently'), the result of his exposition of the
Fifth Amendment privilege is that Scorpio's statement of the
girl's whereabouts is inadmissible, but the body itself is admissi-
ble evidence (pp 46-88). That gives the District Attorney the gun
(linking Scorpio to earlier killings) and the body, along with Cal-
laghan's testimony about everything except Scorpio's statement
as to where the girl's body can be found. (As for deterring police
brutality, Amar would again repair to tort law remedies and the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures of persons, rather than transform a limited testimonial
privilege into an engine for judicial regulation of police practices.
It is the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth, that limits the third
degree.) (pp 68, 87-88).
What about Scorpio's plea for a lawyer? The Sixth Amend-
ment, Amar argues, is about protecting the innocent and seeking
the truth, through fair, speedy, and public trials, the right to con-
front adverse witnesses and the right to call one's own (pp 89-
144). (His textual explication of the two Sixth Amendment "wit-
ness" clauses and, indirectly, of the right to "compulsory" process,
reinforces his argument for a narrow reading of the Fifth
Amendment privilege not to be "compelled" to "be a witness"
against oneself.) (pp 93-94). The right to the assistance of counsel
exists to effectuate these other Sixth Amendment rights, all for
the sake of protecting innocence (including the "innocence" inter-
est in not being held to a higher degree of culpability than war-
ranted for one's wrongful acts). Guilty folk might incidentally
benefit from the Sixth Amendment's rules, but that is not the
point of the rules. The point is permitting the accused to vindi-
cate his innocence, by according him the procedural weapons with
which to do so. Extending somewhat beyond that, the right to
counsel provides for a balance of power in the courtroom (which,
again, can be seen as innocence-protecting).
But none of these rights, properly construed, gives the ac-
cused an entitlement to exclude probative evidence, or to avoid
criminal responsibility because of the errors of others (as opposed
to obtaining tort law relief for unjustified restrictions on liberty
or impairment of reputation, argues Amar, reprising his Fourth
2 See text accompanying notes 37-51.
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Amendment theme). Still less does the right to counsel entitle the
accused to use the services of a lawyer for the purpose of thwart-
ing the truth-seeking functions of a trial and of pre-trial pro-
ceedings, such as by presenting, arguing, or turning a blind eye to
peijured testimony, a point with important implications for legal
ethics. Finally, the right to counsel, along with all other Sixth
Amendment rights, attaches only when the individual stands "ac-
cused" (for which the Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury in-
dictment, for capital or "otherwise infamous" crimes). Judge Ban-
nerman of the appellate court notwithstanding, nothing in the
Sixth Amendment gives Scorpio a right to a lawyer while Inspec-
tor Callaghan steps on Scorpio's wounded leg to learn the location
of the dying girl. Whatever evidence is otherwise admissible con-
sistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is not rendered
inadmissible by Dirty Harry's failure to honor Scorpio's request
for a lawyer.
These conclusions are, to the academic criminal procedure
establishment, absolutely outrageous. And they have been
greeted with expressions of outrage, anger, and fits of intemper-
ateness befitting the vigor and rigor of Professor Amar's assault
on that establishment. (The book is a collection and slight re-
editing of Amar's earlier articles on the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, and of short essays on juries and remedies, and
have thus been a central part of the academic debate for several
years already.)' Amar, who comes at the field from the perspec-
tive of a broad-gauged constitutional law scholar, not that of a
criminal law practitioner turned academic, argues that "the kind
of constitutional law discourse and scholarship that now domi-
nates criminal procedure is generally, in a word, bad constitu-
tional law-constitutional law insouciant about constitutional
text, ignorant of constitutional history, and inattentive to consti-
tutional structure" (pp ix-x). And his conclusions are backed up by
an impressive mastery of textual analysis, constitutional struc-
ture, constitutional history, constitutional precedent (including
' Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757 (1994);
Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Cause, 93 Mich L Rev 857 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth
Amendment First Principles, 84 Georgetown L J 641 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, The Future
of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 Am Crim L Rev 1123 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar,
Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 UC Davis L Rev 1169 (1995).
Amar has written several other articles on constitutional criminal procedure (see, for
example, Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney
King, 95 Colum L Rev 1 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple,
106 Yale L J 1807 (1997)), but the three "First Principles" articles that comprise the bulk
of this book are the ones that have defined the debate between Amar and his critics.
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precedent with deeper roots than the 1960s), constitutional
remedies, and simple logic.
Amar has hit them where they live. While his analysis is
vulnerable at several junctures-chiefly, in my view, where he
tries to defend his left flank and so fails to follow his methodo-
logical premises to their proper conclusions-he has the estab-
lishment dead to rights on questions of interpretive methodology.
The Constitution-the words of the text, the historical under-
standing of those words, their structural, logical, and linguistic
relation to one another and to larger constitutional principles-
does not support anything at all resembling the regime of
"constitutional criminal procedure" under which we now suffer.
Dirty Harry's basic instinct was right. He just needed the
constitutional scholarship of Akhil Amar to cover his back.
My goal in the remainder of this review is twofold. First, in
Section III, I analyze the impact of Amar's scholarship on the
methodologies and ideologies of constitutional criminal proce-
dure, concluding that Amar brings an important methodological
corrective to present criminal procedure scholarship-one that
the academic criminal procedure establishment rightly finds
threatening, and to which it has responded, predictably, with
more ferocity than persuasiveness. Second, in Section IV, I argue
that, in at least one respect (the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination), Amar's analysis misfires-but not in
the direction his critics think. Amar's own methodology and evi-
dence better support the yet more radical conclusion that the
privilege is not triggered by police interrogation in any form, but
only by formal judicial compulsion backed by force of law, sug-
gesting that the Supreme Court's truly serious doctrinal errors
are its decisions in Miranda v Arizona4 and Griffin v California,5
not the relatively peripheral issue of the scope of "immunity" re-
quired to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.
III. SUDDEN IMPACT: THE GENERATIONS, METHODOLOGIES, AND
IDEOLOGIES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Professor Amar's entry into the field of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure, beginning with his article on the Fourth Amend-
ment in 1994 (now Chapter One of the book), has had a dramatic
and immediate effect on legal scholarship in this area, reinvigor-
ating the debate by launching a frontal assault on its most fun-
damental premises. Amar has joined a small cadre of under-forty
384 US 436 (1966).
380 US 609 (1965).
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scholars who have brought new excitement and interest to this
area: Paul Cassell at Utah, Donald Dripps at Illinois, Nancy King
at Vanderbilt, Tracey Maclin at Boston University, Carol Steiker
at Harvard, Bill Stuntz at Virginia, Ron Wright at Wake Forest.
What had been a relatively stagnant discussion, nibbling at the
margins of small doctrines, counter-doctrines, and sub-doctrines,
has been rocked by Amar's challenge to the principles that had
framed the debate for thirty years or more.
Amar's approach, both in its method and in its results, is a
major challenge not only to the Supreme Court's body of caselaw,
but also to the prevailing academic orthodoxy about the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, an orthodoxy that has reigned
since the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution during
the 1960s. That revolution, both in the courts and in the acad-
emy, has shown remarkable resilience in surviving the personnel
changes of the Burger and Rehnquist eras. The dominant para-
digm of constitutional criminal procedure today uses the specific
provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments as
springboards for an active, affirmative judicial role in reforming
criminal procedure practices to protect the rights of criminal de-
fendants and meet the perceived needs of contemporary society to
be free from police tyranny (on the one hand) and from rampant,
unpunished criminal activity (on the other).
While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts chipped away at the
margins of the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution,
they did not mount a truly serious assault on its essential meth-
odological premises. The different generations of the Court simply
had different perceptions of how to balance the various needs of
society with the interests of criminal defendants, and of how
these amendments might best be interpreted to serve those
needs. The Warren Court emphasized defendants' rights as the
most important, unaddressed policy concern. The Burger Court
emphasized, as a counterweight, the needs of society for "law-
and-order." The Rehnquist Court has continued the same instru-
mentalist project as the Burger Court, but with less division, less
opposition, and (consequently) less enthusiasm.
The interpretive methodology, however, has remained largely
the same: an emphasis on policy and practicality, and on infer-
ences and extrapolations from the text, in the service of (differing
views of) outcomes thought to contribute to a sound and just
criminal justice system. In this area of constitutional law, how-
ever, there has been a relative lack of interest, consistent over
time and across ideological divides, in constitutional text, histori-
cal subtext, or the larger context of the document as a whole.
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Critics of the Warren Court charged it with "judicial activism" in
this area (among others), for disregarding precedent and pushing
its own policy agenda. Critics of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
(typically, defenders of the Warren Court's product) have leveled
essentially the same charge. And both groups of critics have been
right. The intense sniping at the margins has camouflaged a
large and ironic area of agreement on method: William Rehnquist
looks like a right-handed William Brennan, not a different breed
of animal.
While constitutional law in general has enjoyed over the last
half-generation (or suffered, depending on your view) an intense
resurgence of debate over the primacy of text, original intention,
and constitutional structure, criminal procedure has been an en-
clave largely removed from this debate. In part, this may be at-
tributable to the fact that "criminal procedure" and "constitu-
tional law" are kept in separate rooms of the (now-)traditional
law school curriculum. The Warren Court criminal procedure
revolution essentially gave rise to its own discrete discipline and
its own distinct law school course. None of the major constitu-
tional law casebooks any longer contains extended discussion of
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments as subjects of constitu-
tional law study in their own right. And why should they? Those
topics are covered elsewhere in the curriculum-in massive case-
books (like the Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel tome) reflecting the
explosion of caselaw in this area in the last thirty-five years.
A half-generation ago, things were different. Paul Freund's
popular Harvard casebook, in its 1967 (third) edition, used by
many law students in the late 1960s and 1970s, discussed the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, just as it discussed the
First, as an important chunk of constitutional law material, tak-
ing up more than two hundred pages of the text.6 The 1970 ver-
sion of Gerald Gunther's famous casebook (then still "Gunther
and Dowling") devoted well over a hundred pages to the subject
as well, including a full chapter entitled "Procedural Rights in the
Administration of Criminal Justice" that addressed search and
seizure, the Fifth Amendment privilege and Miranda, the right to
counsel, fair trial, confrontation clause rights, double jeopardy,
cruel and unusual punishment, and excessive bail.7 Kamisar, La-
c Paul A. Freund, et al, 2 Constitutional Law: Cases and Other Problems 1320-1542
(Little, Brown 3d ed 1967).
Gerald Gunther and Noel T. Dowling, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 796-
924 (Foundation 8th ed 1970). The 1974 supplement included nearly fifty pages of new
material on criminal procedure. Gerald Gunther and Noel T. Dowling, Constitutional Law
and Individual Rights in Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 1974 Supplement 113-
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Fave, and Israel's massive Modern Criminal Procedure8 casebook
did not appear on the scene until 1965, quickly needed another
edition by 1966, and did not reach full bloom until its third (1969)
and fourth (1974) editions. By 1980, its fifth edition engulfed
1635 double-columned pages. Meanwhile, Gunther's 1980 Consti-
tutional Law casebook had whittled its discussion of criminal
procedure to just twenty-five pages, addressed almost exclusively
to the issue of "incorporation" of Bill of Rights provisions by the
Fourteenth Amendment The Freund book followed the same
pattern. The preface to the 1977 (fourth) edition was explicit
about the change:
This expansion [of other material], together with the inclu-
sion of recent decisions, has obviously required some coun-
tervailing compression . . . . Partly this has been accom-
plished through... a substantial reduction in the coverage
of the guarantees of criminal procedure. The latter topic,
which is dealt with in courses on criminal law, has been re-
tained insofar as it raises problems of federalism.
Gerald Gunther had formally announced a similar retreat in
1975.1
Following the division of subject matter, there has been (by
and large) a division of legal scholars. With few exceptions,
criminal proceduralists are not broad-gauged "constitutional law
types." They are, by and large, civil libertarians, former criminal
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and those with interests in
the criminal justice system. They are (usually) not constitutional
generalists or big-picture constitutional theorists. At the same
time, constitutional law scholars have become largely content to
leave this separate province alone. It is taught by criminal proce-
dure "specialists." After all, the subject is no longer covered in the
18, 132-76 (Foundation 1974).
' Yale Kamisar, Wayne LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure
(West 1965).
' Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 476-501 (Foundation 10th
ed 1980).
- Paul A. Freund, et al, Constitutional Law: Cases and Other Problems xxiii (Little,
Brown 4th ed 1977).
" Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials xx (Foundation 9th ed
1975) ("Over the years, some areas once staples of constitutional law courses have devel-
oped such an identity and complexity of their own as to warrant treatment as separate
disciplines. What was once the fate of administrative law, for example, has now become
appropriate for the constitutional requirements of criminal procedure. Some samples of
those developments are retained, for the light they throw on the general evolution of due
process standards and the incorporation controversy, but full treatment of the details is
left to other courses.").
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constitutional law casebooks. Besides, it has become a world of
technical rules: rules for bottles; rules for bottles in jackets; rules
for bottles in jackets in cars; rules for bottles in jackets in trunks
of cars; rules for bottles in jackets in trunks of cars that are
moving, that were stopped for traffic violations, or at checkpoints,
or during emergencies, or incident to arrest. Big Think constitu-
tional law theorists have no use for such arcana. Accordingly, the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments have come to be treated by
mainstream constitutional law scholarship as backwaters; and,
returning the compliment, the field of criminal procedure seem-
ingly has ignored, or dismissed, the important methodological de-
bates within constitutional law as just so much irrelevant, im-
practical nonsense. The two distinct schools of scholars never
swim in each other's streams and have little regard for each
other's work.'
Enter Akhil Amar. Professor Amar is, first and foremost, a
big-picture constitutional law scholar and theorist. He does not
come at criminal procedure as a criminal proceduralist. He has
not practiced criminal law and procedure, from either side. He is
neither a partisan of the Warren Court criminal procedure revo-
lution nor a law-and-order conservative. (Politically, Amar is a
moderate-to-liberal Democrat.) Instead, Amar came to the field of
criminal procedure along a road less travelled: structural (as dis-
tinguished from rights-focused) constitutional law.
Amar's early scholarship focused on structural features of
the Constitution-Article III and federal jurisdiction, sovereign
immunity, federalism. 3 His intriguing 1991 article, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution,4 focused on the structural aspects of the
Bill of Rights, pressing the theme that the Bill of Rights is itself a
' Professors J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson have noted that the regrettable effects
of such a division work both ways: just as criminal procedure specialists tend to treat the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments "not as constitutional law issues but as administra-
tion ofjustice issues," constitutional law scholarship suffers from omission of relevant dis-
cussions from Supreme Court cases involving these provisions, from a perceived "shrink-
ing of the Bill of Rights," and from the loss of "the sense of a Bill of Rights whose compo-
nent parts are interrelated with each other." J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, On the
Notion of Canonicity 36 (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev).
"Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article HI: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Fed-
eralism, 96 Yale L J 1425 (1987); Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U Chi L Rev 443 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-
Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U Pa L Rev 1499 (1990). Amar's self-
styled "neo-Federalist" approach in these areas sought to unite traditional origi-
nalist/textualist analysis with structural principles and inferences drawn from Federalist
political theory, as translated into constitutional text. For a good, short explanation and
defense of Amars (early) methodology, see Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 207-08 n 7.
" Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131 (1991).
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"constitution"-that is, a continuation of the 1787 Constitution's
essentially structural project of dividing power among various in-
stitutions (adding press, church, militia, and juries to the original
Constitution's legislative-executive-judicial trinity of powers), not
simply a catalogue of discrete, unrelated individual rights.
Amar's analysis of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments-
the project that has culminated in The Constitution and Criminal
Procedure-is an outgrowth of that earlier project of thinking
about "The Bill of Rights as a Constitution." That 1991 article
contained a short prototype of the Fourth Amendment analysis
that eventually grew into Chapter One of Amar's book. 5 It also
contained an extensive discussion of the centrality of criminal
and civil juries in the overall structure of the Bill of Rights, an in-
sight that ripened into the final chapter of Amar's book, the "ap-
pendix" on reforming the jury (pp 161-78). Thus, unlike most
academics writing in the area of criminal procedure, Amar seems
less to have chosen the field than to have gravitated toward it,
almost unintentionally, as a consequence of broader interests in
the overall structure, logic, and cohesiveness of the Constitution
as an integrated political and legal document.
Amar's book reflects that path and those broader interests.
The book is, in a sense, not merely about search and seizure, self-
incrimination, and the rights to trial, jury, and counsel, but also
about the proper understanding of those specific rights within the
broader scheme of liberty and institutional checks created by the
Constitution. The approach is marvelously original-yet faith-
fully originalist, in that it seeks to reclaim original meaning(s)
lost through generations of disuse or misuse. Amar's approach
yields stunning insights, ignored by more "mainstream" criminal
procedure scholarship, into the history, original meaning, and
contemporary (mis)application of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. In so doing, Amar's scholarship has quite thor-
oughly enriched our understanding of these provisions.
Amar's work, however, does not start from the same ideologi-
cal premise as nearly all previous scholarship about criminal pro-
cedure since the Warren Court revolution. Most notably, it does
not focus on, or emphasize, the rights of the individual criminal
defendant. It is not clear whether this is a true blind spot in
Amar's scholarship; he appears simply to wish to emphasize that
' See id at 1175-81. At one point in the "Bill of Rights" article's discussion of the
Fourth Amendment, Amar credits me for one of his formulations about the relationship
between the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness Clause. Id at 1180 n 218. I am hon-
ored that this is the one and only part of his earlier discussion that Amar explicitly repu-
diates in his book. See p 181 n 8.
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which has been neglected. And he does emphasize different, ne-
glected aspects of individual rights-the right of innocent citizens
to effective remedies for unreasonable searches and seizures, un-
distorted by the effects of the exclusionary rule; the right of inno-
cent defendants to vindication through effective rights of compul-
sory process and confrontation, undistorted by a guilty witness's
privilege against self-incrimination; the right of citizens in gen-
eral to serve on juries and vindicate the rights of others; the right
of the public to be safer from crime.
In shifting the emphasis, however, Amar has provoked a
veritable barrage of sharply critical-even hostile-attacks from
scholars defending the existing Warren/Burger/Rehnquist para-
digm. Some of the attacks have been measured and sophisti-
cated.16 Others have been less so, bordering on the personal and
hysterical." In some ways, the fact of the counterattacks, and
their occasional vehemence, should not be surprising. In a sense,
Amar has launched an (imperialistic?) attack on Criminal Proce-
dure as a separate subject of legal scholarship, attempting to re-
capture that field for Constitutional Law's empire. In doing so, he
has denounced practically everything ever written by the most
important leaders of the (separatist?) criminal procedure acad-
emy. The tone of the counterattacks sometimes has had the feel-
ing of the impassioned rhetoric of a resistance movement directed
at an evil, invading army, as if Amar's scholarship were the
moral equivalent of the Anschluss. Amar is a newcomer to crimi-
nal procedure; worse, he is a (mildly) disrespectful interloper,
who is not shy about claiming that he has "elegantly solved" per-
ennially thorny constitutional problems (p 76). Who is this Yalie
constitutional-law parvenu who thinks he can waltz into the field
16 In particular, there is much to commend in the rebuttals to Amar, on specific points,
by Professors Steiker and Dershowitz at Harvard and (indirectly) Professor Alschuler at
Chicago. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev
820 (1994); Alan Dershowitz, Crime and Truth, Slate <http://www.slate.com/Book Re-
view2/97-03-25/Book Review2.asp> (March 25, 1997); Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar
Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 Mich L Rev 2625, 2648
& n 84 (1996).
" H. Richard Uviller, Book Review, The Lawyer's Bookshelf, NY L J 2 (April 18, 1997).
Professor Uviller's review calls Amar an "academic exhibitionist" whose "penchant for
careless outrage is annoying." Id. The nicest thing Uviller has to say is that Amar has "a
respectable employer (Yale University Law School)," id-itself a dubious observation. I
address some of Uviller's other errors presently. See text accompanying notes 19-21.
Other scholarly attacks on Amar have been quite harsh, but less vitriolic and per-
sonal. See, for example, Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 Mich L Rev 929 (1995); Donald A. Dripps, Ak-
hil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: Here I Go Down That Wrong
Road Again, 74 NC L Rev 1559 (1996); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S Cal L Rev 1 (1994).
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of criminal procedure, without having practiced law a day in his
life (let alone criminal law), and turn the whole field on its head
with three articles in three years?!18
The answer is that Amar is a constitutionalist with a distinc-
tive methodology, powerful on its own terms, that poses a genu-
ine threat to the criminal procedure establishment. Amar's proj-
ect largely succeeds-on its own terms. The main question sepa-
rating Amar from his critics-and it is a huge chasm that divides
them-is whether those are the terms on which the debate should
be waged. Much of the academic counterattack on Amar can be
seen as a concerted attempt to defend a paradigm-the Warren
Court paradigm-against an invading interpretive methodology.
But the counterattacks frequently misfire in their attempts to
characterize and critique Amar's methodology, in part because
Amar's method is not easy to pigeonhole into two-dimensional
portraits of "textualism" or "original intent." The critics, perhaps
because they are criminal proceduralists rather than constitu-
tionalists, at times seem unable (or unwilling) to grapple in a
thoughtful way with questions of interpretive methodology.
Consider, for example, the critique offered by Professor Rich-
ard Uviller.' Uviller writes simply: "Claiming affinity with Jus-
tices Hugo Black and Antonin Scalia, Amar is a textualist" and
clumps Amar with "his mentor Scalia." ° This is absurd reduc-
tionism. Mistaking Akhil Amar for Justice Scalia is a little like
mistaking Stephen Breyer for Robert Bork. I suppose if one is
standing far enough out in left field and has an insufficiently
powerful lens (or just isn't trying very hard), they all look pretty
much the same. But that is not the kind of mistake serious con-
stitutional scholars would make. Amar is many things, but he's
no Antonin Scalia.
Actually, the difficulty is that Amar is many things. The pas-
sage from which Uviller probably draws his absurd reductio is
contained in a footnote early in Amar's Fourth Amendment chap-
ter, where he notes his methodological ecumenism and how it
draws on the views of a wide range of justices. "In trying to take
constitutional text and history seriously, I follow the lead of Jus-
IS For a mild variant of this attitude, see Dripps, 74 NC L Rev at 1561 (cited in note
17) ("[T]he recent entry into the criminal procedure field of Akhil Amar, the brilliant,
quirky Yale constitutionalist, is a signal development."). Compare Dershowitz, Slate (cited
in note 16) (Amar's "absence of hands-on experience with our current criminal-justice sys-
tem-his lack of feel for how it actually works-puts him at a perceptible disadvantage
when seeking to strike this exquisitely delicate balance [between truth and considerations
of privacy or equality].").




tices Black and Scalia," Amar writes (p 179 n 4). But he goes on
in the same footnote to connect up his method with pronounce-
ments from Justices Stevens, White, Jackson, Stewart, Marshall
(both John and Thurgood), Blackmun, Harlan (the younger), and
Brennan as well. Amar explicitly embraces critical race theory
and feminism as aids in understanding what should constitute
constitutional "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment-
an idea that does not exactly resonate with Scalia's
jurisprudence, at least not in any judicial opinion or article I can
recall.2 Elsewhere, Amar appeals to the "spirit" of constitutional
language and to premises "plainly presupposed" by language that
does not precisely say what (he infers) seems to be implicit. He
explicitly distinguishes between his "plain-meaning approach
sensitive to letter and spirit and, on the other hand, wooden
literalism" (p 132).'
Amar is a textualist in the broad sense that he takes text se-
riously, seeks to interpret a provision (where fairly possible) in a
manner that makes sense of its actual wording, and as a rule
abjures anti-textual methodology that would lead to interpreta-
tions affirmatively contrary to the words employed. As others
have recognized, this is textualism of a sort, but it differs in im-
portant respects from the approaches of others for whom that la-
bel would be far more apt.23 But Amar is not a textualist if by
that is meant that his interpretive method is limited by the words
of the text. (Indeed, I argue below that Amar is far too willing to
countenance atextual arguments for certain activist judicial in-
terpretations of the Fifth Amendment.) Amar looks liberally-
sometimes too liberally-to other sources of constitutional
meaning besides text: history, constitutional structure, precedent,
and even policy. He does, however, have a fairly clear hierarchy
concerning the relative authority of these sources (essentially, the
21 Uviller has a strange take on Amar's discussion of the insights of feminism into
what constitutes "unreasonableness" in a government search. Amar employs examples of
searches that might be especially unreasonable because of their sexually harassing or in-
timidating circumstances, or because of gender differences between the searcher and the
searched (p 38). (Amar makes much the same point with respect to race, at p 37.) Uviller
seems to miss the point entirely and instead comes irresponsibly close to implying that
Amar's examples reflect personal perversity. Uviller, NY L J at 2 (cited in note 17). This
kind of personal attack has no place in serious discussion of serious constitutional issues.
' See also p 94 ("A sensible Sixth Amendment jurisprudence must begin with plain
meaning, but it must not end there.").
' Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L J 541, 552, 556 (1994) (noting the ways in which Amar's methodol-
ogy is textualist and originalist, but noting as well differences among interpreters within
these broad categories). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Many Faces of "Judi-
cial Restraint", 1993 Pub Int L Rev 3, 7-10 (discussing Scalia's textualism).
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order just listed), and an implicit set of rules concerning when it
is appropriate to move down the hierarchy from one source to the
next. In this sense, Amar is better described as a practitioner of a
holistic "constructivist coherence" method.'
As a somewhat eclectic, yet disciplined, constructivist coher-
ence interpreter, Amar takes text very seriously indeed and re-
quires an especially convincing argument from history, constitu-
tional structure, precedent, or policy to rebut what seem to be
straightforward readings of straightforward texts. When history
confirms the presumptive plain meaning of a plain text, Amar
stands ready to close the door, but still leaves it open a crack in
case an especially compelling structural, policy, or pragmatic ar-
gument suggests a different result.
Similarly, where text alone fails to supply a clear answer-
that is, where a word or phrase is susceptible to a range of linguis-
tically faithful interpretations-Amar looks first to history for in-
sights as to which understanding might be preferable. Amar is no
serf to "original intent," but history matters. Indeed, even a
seemingly straightforward provision must be interpreted in a way
that is sensitive to the historical context in which the provision
was enacted and to what folks at the time thought the provision
meant and how they intended it to operate. Significantly, though,
when searching through history for guidance in interpreting a le-
gal text, the search parameters-what constitute relevant data,
the use to which that data can be put-are established by the
constraints of the text, the meaning of which the historical data is
supposed to help enlighten (not replace). History, used in aid of
constitutional interpretation, is only relevant to the extent that it
coheres sensibly with constitutional text. It may not supplant or
contradict the text. If it does, it is interesting history, but reliance
thereon is bad constitutional law. The framers and ratifiers
adopted a legal text, not a history.25 Some commentators who
2 See Richard IL Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 100 Harv L Rev 1189, 1237 (1987). Amar explicitly credits Fallon's article,
and Phillip Bobbitt's book Constitutional Fate (Oxford 1982), in his discussion of "constitu-
tional modalities of text, history, and structure." See p 115 & n 110.
' Scholarly criticisms of "law office history" frequently miss the mark on this point.
Often, such criticisms fall into a form of parochial pseudo-intellectual snobbery that fails
to consider the essentially instrumental nature of historical analysis within the enterprise
of legal interpretation. (Or, perhaps, such criticisms recognize the instrumental nature of
historical inquiry for legal analysis, but resent it.) "Law office history" may be bad history
if it means selective or partial use of history, because an incomplete or one-sided portrait
is historically inaccurate. But "law office history" is bad law if it does not discriminate in
identifying that part of the historical data that genuinely informs the meaning of a legal
text. The historian looks at a roomful of senators and sees one hundred different nuanced
views-and rightly so. The lawyer sees a law that passed by a vote of 51-49 and looks at
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have challenged Amar's historical analysis in support of his
Fourth Amendment interpretation seem to have made this mis-
take of equating originalist interpretations of a legal text with
the bare study of history per se.26
Moreover, even on their own terms, the critics' attacks on
Amar's history fail. Amar's presentation of the historical sup-
porting evidence has thrown down a simple gauntlet. Amar's
dare, in essence, is the following: Show me the early state consti-
tutional provision or amendment proposal by a ratifying state
that contains a warrant requirement (or warrant "preference") or
that explicitly links the "unreasonableness" of a search to the
presence or absence of a warrant. Show me a founding-era state-
ment by a prominent (or, for that matter, obscure) framer, rati-
fier, anti-federalist, scholarly commentator, or judge supporting
either a warrant requirement or the exclusionary rule. Show me
the arguments and explanations of those who were critical to its passage-and rightly so.
Therein lies the difference. The text adopted constrains the historical inquiry to a nar-
rower sphere of relevance-for purposes of doing legal history and legal interpretation.
Legal interpretation and history have different rules of what is relevant. See Jack N.
Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 11 (Knopf
1996) ("It is not the province of the historian to decide questions of law.").
Those who ignore this difference employ a fairly standard strategy. First, the "law of-
fice interpreter" is accused of having ignored some of the history relevant to the general
issue being considered. Second, it is argued that this history is considerably more inde-
terminate and ambiguous than the account relied on by the law office interpreter. (Both
charges are almost always easy to support.) The next step, and the classic error, is to infer
from the assertedly more comprehensive consideration of history-despite its stipulated
ambiguity-some broad lesson or general principle, formulated at a fairly high level of
generality, which is then read back into the legal text as if it were a determinate legal rule
commanded by a determinate text. It is easy to play this trick on the Fourth Amendment,
because the background history is so rich and extensive.
Professor Morgan Cloud, in his recent review of William Cuddihy's doctoral thesis
(which Cloud uses as an occasion for criticizing Amar's use of Fourth Amendment history),
falls into this pattern of error rather badly in my view. See Morgan Cloud, Searching
through History; Searching for History, 63 U Chi L Rev 1707, 1710, 1730-47 (1996). Cloud
begins by ignoring the words of the Fourth Amendment, noting instead that different
theorists have read it different ways. He then notes that search and seizure history is am-
biguous, that the law was dynamic and changed much over time, id at 1716-17, and that
the historical data has been read in any of a number of ways, id at 1723. Next, he leaps to
a high level of abstraction, finding that "[a] significant part of the historical record" sup-
ports the general principle that "the Framers acted to eliminate search and seizure meth-
ods that permitted the arbitrary exercise of discretion and were conducted without good
cause, whether or not warrants were employed." Id at 1729. Finally, Cloud reads that ab-
stract principle back into the text of the Amendment, finding that history "supports the
conclusion.., that the Fourth Amendment rejects both warrantless general searches and
general warrants as unreasonable." Id at 1723-24. The result is unsatisfactory as legal
analysis, and seems to reflect a methodology far more subject to criticism as an improper
use of history than is Amar's.
On Amar's use of history, in addition to Professor Cloud's writing (see note 25), see
Maclin, 68 S Cal L Rev at 4-25 (cited in note 17); Steiker, 107 Harv L Rev at 826-28 (cited
in note 16).
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any Fourth Amendment case (or state constitutional counterpart)
where exclusion is the remedy, anywhere in America, any time in
the first hundred years of our nation's history.
Amar has thus stated, clearly and directly, what would con-
stitute historical evidence falsifying his thesis, and challenged his
critics to put up or shut up. So far as I can tell, these challenges
have gone unanswered. 7 In light of all this, it simply will not do
to accuse Amar of choosing selectively from the historical record.2
Amar's synthesis-which makes entire sense of the Fourth
Amendment text as written, which is no small feat-finds sub-
stantial historical support, and his opponents cannot find compa-
rable historical warrant (so to speak) for the present liberal-
orthodox synthesis.
Beyond text, structure, and history-but, for Amar, rigor-
ously subject to the requirement of consistency with these crite-
ria-lie considerations of precedent, policy, and pragmatism.
Precedent is relevant to Amar, but not in the absurd sense that
one can never look any further back than the Warren Court, or
that one must slavishly treat the most recent Supreme Court
pronouncement as equivalent to the Constitution itself. Judicial
decisions must reflect and explicate the Constitution's text, his-
tory, and structure, not supplant them. Often, an earlier genera-
tion's caselaw made better sense of the text and was more consis-
tent with the original understanding (from which it was not as
far removed in time and social context) than is later caselaw.29
It is thus not at all surprising that Amar's answers differ
from those of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. Nor is
it a particularly salient critique that Amar's reading is not consis-
tent with a great deal of recent judicial precedent." That is, after
Maclin's response to Amar's Fourth Amendment article offers no such evidence.
Macin, 68 S Cal L Rev I (cited in note 17). Cloud's argument does not address these
points, but instead addresses Amar's rhetorical flourish that "juries, not judges, are the
heroes of the Founders' Fourth Amendment story,' Cloud, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1730 (cited
in note 25), quoting Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 771 (cited in note 3), by noting several early
statutes where specific warrants were required as a predicate to a search. Cloud, 63 U Chi
L Rev at 1737-43 (cited in note 25). This evidence, however, is not responsive to Amar's
point-in-chief, which is that the Warrant Clause's specific requirements do not establish
that warrants are invariably required for constitutional reasonableness. The text of the
Fourth Amendment does not say that they are, and nothing in Cloud's historical analysis
contradicts this point.
' See Cloud, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1710, 1732 (cited in note 25).
' One of Amar's most interesting insights, attributable in part to the fact that he is a
constitutional law generalist, not just a criminal proceduralist, is that a great deal of doc-
trinal development in criminal procedure, from Boyd to Weeks, was Lochner-era thinking
and reflected Lochner-era judicial activism focused on protecting property rights and eco-
nomic liberties (pp 22-25, 62).
' That is the thrust of Professor Kamisar's response to Amar. 93 Mich L Rev 929
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all, presumably part of Amar's point in writing the book. The dif-
ference between Amar's approach and that of Professor Yale Ka-
misar, for example, is that they employ opposite interpretive hi-
erarchies. Kamisar, perhaps the dean of the liberal-orthodox
criminal procedure establishment, starts from the bottom of
Amar's interpretive ladder-with policy premises concerning sub-
stantively desirable approaches to protection of the rights of
criminal defendants, and with Warren Court precedent circa 1967
(which largely reflected these policy premises). Kamisar never
works up to serious consideration of constitutional text, history,
or structure. For Kamisar, it is sufficient refutation that Amar's
approach to the Fifth Amendment calls into question thirty-odd
years of judicially crafted reform of police practices that might
not otherwise have taken place (and thirty-odd years of academic
criminal procedure scholarship that has worked within that
paradigm). For Amar, however, Kamisar's refutation is insuffi-
cient because it does not seriously wrestle with the text, history,
and structure of the Constitution.?'
Professor Donald Dripps attacks Amar's Fourth Amendment
analysis on somewhat different grounds.32 Dripps's critique con-
sists essentially of three propositions. First, Dripps contends that
Amar's theory is not entirely original, but is similar to views ad-
vanced by Telford Taylor and Richard Posner. (This is true, and
Amar credits Taylor and Posner with important contributions on
which he has attempted to build.) (pp 5, 179 n 5).3' Second,
Dripps argues that Amar's interpretation must be wrong because
it was not embraced when Taylor or Posner advanced earlier ver-
sions of it. Third, Dripps criticizes Amar's distinctive variant of
these earlier theories-an aggressive reinvigoration of civil reme-
dial schemes for Fourth Amendment violations, including repu-
diation of certain immunity doctrines-as too "politically counter-
factual" ever to be adopted. 4
Dripps's critique is unimpressive, primarily because it seems
so unresponsive. If Amar is right, it is no rebuttal to his argu-
ment about constitutional meaning that it is "politically counter-
factual" or that earlier variants of the argument have not (yet)
taken hold with the courts. Sure Amar's position is politically
(cited in note 17).
" See Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B. Lettow, Self-Incrimination and the Constitution:
A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Kamisar, 93 Mich L Rev 1011 (1995).
= Dripps, 74 NC L Rev 1559 (cited in note 17).
See Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 19-114 (Ohio State
1969); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 S Ct Rev 49.
' Dripps, 74 NC L Rev at 1620 (cited in note 17).
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counterfactual, but so what? The legal argument against Plessy
was politically counterfactual for a good long time. An academic
legal argument's political or judicial success should be deter-
mined by its soundness, not the other way around.
Unlike some other critics within the criminal procedure es-
tablishment, however, Dripps voices a warm welcome to the in-
cursion of constitutional theory into criminal procedure. 5 But like
Kamisar and others, he has an inverted hierarchy of what should
count most in constitutional interpretation. In a revealing foot-
note, Dripps writes that, in their reply to Kamisar on the Fifth
Amendment, Amar and his co-author Renee Lettow "fall back
from precedent to text and history."36
Dripps's remark unwittingly frames the central issue here,
which is methodological: Is reliance on text and history really a
"fallback" position when precedent does not support one's pre-
ferred interpretation? Do we read legal texts through the lens of
precedent and policy, first and foremost? Or do text, history, and
structure constitute (as Amar maintains) the true "first princi-
ples" of constitutional interpretation, for the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments no less than for any other constitutional pro-
vision? Amar's critics appear to recognize the importance of his
methodological challenge, but not fully to understand it on its
own terms. If Amar's method is right-if traditional principles of
constitutional analysis should govern the provinces of constitu-
tional criminal procedure-then the entire field of constitutional
criminal procedure is due for an overhaul. That indeed is the
burden of Amar's book, and it is a burden he largely succeeds in
bearing.
IV. THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys, AND THE UGLY
FIFTH AMENDMENT
If there is a chink in Akhil Amar's text-history-structure-
coherency armor, it is in his analysis of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. His reinterpretation of the
self-incrimination clause is brilliant, packed with insights, makes
a certain amount of good, practical, common sense, and is in vir-
tually every way superior to present doctrine and mainstream
scholarly analysis. But it is almost surely wrong-not, however,
Id at 1563.
Id at 1631 n 321 (emphasis added). Compare Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co,
490 US 504, 529-30 (1989) (Scalia concurring) (noting and mocking the argument of coun-
sel: 'Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful. Thus, we turn to the other
guidepost in this difficult area, statutory language!").
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for the reasons his liberal critics suggest, but because he does not
go far enough in correcting judicial overreading of the scope of the
privilege.
For the same reasons that Amar's account of the Fourth
Amendment is so compelling-it takes the text seriously and
gives each clause its common and original understanding, pre-
senting a holistically sound and sensible interpretation-his ac-
count of the Fifth Amendment feels incomplete and unconvincing.
The problem seems to be that Amar very badly wants to make
good policy sense out of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination and to make that policy cohere with the Sixth
Amendment's emphasis on procedural protections designed to
vindicate the innocent and assure reliable convictions. But it
simply cannot be done with the words the framers left us. The
Fifth Amendment means what it says and what it says is fairly
ridiculous, at least to modern sensibilities.
Briefly stated, Amar's central thesis is that the Fifth
Amendment privilege ("No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.. .") should be un-
derstood to bar the introduction at an accused's criminal trial of
his compelled testimonial communications, but not of the non-
testimonial evidentiary "fruits" resulting from such communica-
tions. (Thus, in the Dirty Harry scenario, the dead girl's body is
admissible physical evidence. The only thing excluded is Scorpio's
incriminating statement saying where she was buried.)
Amar accepts, however, the standard, Warren Court-era no-
tion of what constitutes Fifth Amendment "compelled" testimony
and thus does not challenge court-imposed restrictions on police
stationhouse interrogation (Miranda7) and on prosecutorial
comment at trial on a defendant's silence (Griffin"8 ). Indeed,
Amar would be willing to allow courts to expand Miranda. His
testimony-excluded-but-fiuits-admitted rule would permit, in his
view, a "civilized alternative" to police interrogation in the form
of formal, under-oath depositions of suspects before magistrates,
under pain of contempt. (Amar's models here are grand jury tes-
timony and civil discovery.) (p 70). A suspect invoking the privi-
lege could not have his verbal statements introduced against him
at a criminal trial, but any derivative evidence would be admissi-
ble, giving the police the more reliable evidence they really want
(in Amar's view). In return, though, "a deposition approach would
limit abusive police tactics." Amar continues:
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
Griffin v California, 380 US 609 (1965).
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The basic insight uniting pre-Warren Court voluntariness
cases like Brown v. Mississippi and Warren-era landmarks
like Miranda and Escobedo would be preserved and
strengthened: we need to rein in unsupervised police officers
who might be tempted to abuse suspects. The best way to do
this is to shift interrogation from police stations to magis-
trates' hearing rooms (p 76).
The vice of Miranda, according to Amar, is that the Court
failed to require the use of lawyers, magistrates, and record-
ers-and from a civil libertarian perspective, this has been
its undoing. Miranda also failed to create strong incentives
for suspects to talk and to tell the truth-and from a crime
control perspective, this has been its undoing. The deposition
model would combine both perspectives: the suspect would
be protected from abuse and intimidation but must answer
truthfully (p 76).
With all due respect, the deal Amar offers is almost embar-
rassingly naive (in addition to being judicially activist).9 If the
analogy is to civil discovery, police questioning is more akin to
ordinary witness interviews, outside the discovery process, not
formal depositions. Such interviews would not disappear with the
advent of an additional, formal "discovery" process. If unsworn
confessions and incriminating statements are useful law en-
forcement tools (and they are0 ), police will continue to conduct
stationhouse and squad car interrogations. If the concern is that
such questioning is inherently coercive, such coercion will con-
' In fairness, Amar concedes that "[o]n the other hand, more relaxed schemes are also
compatible with the testimonial immunity approach" and goes on to sketch what those al-
ternative regimes might look like (p 77). It is thus not entirely clear whether Amar thinks
that Miranda, or something like it, is constitutionally required. He straddles the fence on
this point: 'The [existence of a] range of possible police station schemes compatible with
testimonial immunity is hardly unique or embarrassing. Rather, it reflects the fact that
the self-incrimination clause historically addressed formal testimonial compulsion in judi-
cial settings . . ." (p 77). In a moment, I will set forth an alternative theory of the Fifth
Amendment based on precisely this last point-that the privilege is concerned with re-
quiring a person to be a witness against himself, under the compulsion of formal judicial
process. Where I differ with Amar is in his willingness to extend the privilege to "the in-
formal compulsion of the modern police station," and to countenance "creative adaptation
of Founding principles" in order to achieve this result (p 77).
"At least, that is what the empirical research, confirming common sense, tends to
show. For the empirical debate on this point, see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs:
An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw U L Rev 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No
Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw U L Rev 1084 (1996); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Mirandals Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social
Costs, 90 Nw U L Rev 500 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates,
91 Nw U L Rev 278 (1996).
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tinue to exist-unless the courts impose some sort of Mega-
Miranda rule prohibiting police questioning, as a rider to Amar's
civilized deposition. That, of course, would be every guilty sus-
pect's (and his lawyer's) fondest dream-not to mention a wildly
atextual invention that would make Miranda look like a model of
judicial restraint. The suspect would surely be entitled to consult
with counsel prior to Amar's civilized deposition. The incentives
to lie will still exist by virtue of Amar's rule concerning admissi-
ble fruits. (The suspect will promptly be informed of this rule by
competent counsel, creating greater temptations to unethical
lawyering in the form of a "lecture" on the implications of the new
use-fruits rule, verging on counseling the client to lie.)41 Anyone
who has ever taken a "civil(ized) deposition" knows what happens
when an intelligent adverse witness has been "prepped" by coun-
sel.
Police will soon enough see this coming, and will do every-
thing possible to circumvent Mega-Miranda and the civilized
deposition. If one is concerned about abusive interrogation tech-
niques, those will simply get pushed back earlier in the process,
before the suspect is fully a "suspect" or before he is in "custody."
It simply does not seem realistic to think that "the use of deposi-
tions and pretrial judicial examination would curb the temptation
to police abuse" (p 87). It seems equally likely to exacerbate it,
relocate it, or simply leave it unchanged.42
I would nonetheless accept Amar's proposal if it convincingly
followed from the text, history, and structure of the Fifth
Amendment. The Miranda expansion plainly does not, however,
and on this point Amar is not being true to his text-history-
structure principles. This is all the more disappointing because
the rest of Amar's Fifth Amendment analysis-specifically, his
central thesis that the privilege does not protect a defendant
against compelled production of nontestimonial incriminating
evidence-has much to commend it as a matter of text, history,
structure, and even precedent. The key word of the text for Amar
is "witness." Drawing from the comparable and parallel usage of
the word "witness" in the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Proc-
ess and Confrontation Clauses, Amar argues that being a "wit-
ness" is about testifying-about words--and not about physical
4 Amar rightly criticizes such a conception of the right to counsel in his Sixth
Amendment chapter (pp 141-44).
' In his dissent in Miranda, Justice Harlan noted that rules designed to check police
abuse can readily be circumvented by one intent on doing so. 384 US at 505 (Harlan dis-
senting) ('Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and
destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.").
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evidence. He notes that the language of the Fifth Amendment dif-
fers from earlier state constitutional forbears in this respect,
which more broadly protected a right of the accused not to be
compelled to "furnish evidence" against himself.'
The key historical fact for Amar is that prior to 1892 the
widespread rule in America concerning what evidence must be
excluded in order to satisfy the Fifth Amendment (and state
counterparts) was testimonial immunity, not use-plus-fruits ex-
clusion." Indeed, Amar argues that it was 'hornbook law as late
as 1960"--and that it always was and remains the rule in Eng-
land and Canada-that courts would not exclude fruits of com-
pelled confessions (p 225 n 238).
Amar offers a related structural insight in support of his nar-
row reading of the privilege. If the rule is that any governmental
compulsion of testimonial communications requires immunity
from use of those statements plus immunity from evidentiary
fruits derived from the statements, state governments may es-
sentially grant significant immunity from prosecutions by other
states and by the federal government, a result possibly violating
structural principles of interstate comity and federalism (p 78).
There may be a correlative separation of powers point here as
well, not noted by Amar but supported by his structural federal-
ism argument. When Congress confers immunity in a legislative
hearing or investigation, it impairs the executive's ability to bring
a subsequent prosecution. The result may be similar, in practical
effect, to a one-house or single committee veto on executive en-
forcement of the laws.45 These difficulties do not disappear, but
they are reduced substantially, if the privilege operates to ex-
clude only the immunized testimony itself, not derivative eviden-
tiary facts.
Certain precedents also support Amar's position. The key
modern case for his analysis is Schmerber v California," a once-
controversial (5-4 at the time) 1966 Warren Court case that is
universally accepted today. Schmerber upheld against Fourth and
Fifth Amendment challenge the taking of involuntary blood sam-
ples from the accused, and has been extended to involuntary fin-
gerprinting, handwriting and voice exemplars, and lineups.
' See pp 82, 227 n 247 (citing the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 ("furnish evi-
dence against himself') and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 ("give evidence against
himself")).
"In 1892, total ("transactional") immunity suddenly became the norm, under the rule
of Counselman v Hitchcock, 142 US 547 (1892). See pp 57-58.
"Compare INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983).
4384 US 757 (1966).
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Schmerber is the origin of the Court's doctrine that the privilege
only applies to "evidence of a testimonial or communicative na-
ture." 7 For Amar, if Schmerber is right-and it has to be right,
Amar argues, or absurd impairments of law enforcement fol-
low 4s-then logically the Fifth Amendment privilege must not ex-
clude fruits of compelled testimony either. The general principle
for which Schmerber may be seen to stand, Amar argues, is that a
criminal suspect can indeed be compelled to furnish evidence
against himself. Thus, compelled statements are excluded; but
compelled production of evidence-including evidence obtained
through compelled statements-does not violate the privilege.
Finally, Amar argues that his reading is necessary to make
the Fifth Amendment cohere with the Sixth-in particular, with
the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor. If the Fifth gives a (guilty)
witness a right to refuse to testify in someone else's case, it de-
prives an (innocent) accused of his Sixth Amendment right to
mount a defense by compelling witnesses to speak. This just can-
not be right, Amar maintains, as it produces an upside-down
world in which the guilty bad guy's right of silence trumps the
innocent but indicted good guy's right to vindication, explicitly
protected by the Compulsory Process Clause. The alternative is
that the witness must be given (if the prosecution agrees-Amar
notes the inequity of power in this regard (p 50)) an "immunity
bath" so thorough as effectively to prevent the prosecution from
subsequently prosecuting the guilty witness for his crimes. The
no-exclusion-of-use-fruits principle, Amar argues, solves this di-
lemma: The innocent defendant can compel the guilty witness to
testify, and only the statements themselves are excluded from the
guilty witness's subsequent trial; all fruits derived from such
statements are admissible. The accused's Sixth Amendment
rights are protected without enabling conspiring mobsters to give
each other immunity baths. Similarly, governments may grant
testimonial use immunity in exchange for compelled legislative,
grand jury, or trial testimony, without impairing too greatly the
ability to prosecute the witness for his crimes.
47 Id at 761.
See p 67:
Though decided by the slimmest of margins in 1966, Schmerber is an absolutely cen-
tral case today-the rock on which a great many cases and a considerable amount of
crime detection policy have been built. Can anyone now imagine even a single Justice
voting that government may not use an arrestee by forcing him to submit to photo-
graphing, fingerprinting, and voice tests whose results may be introduced in a crimi-
nal court?
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These are good arguments-very good arguments-but not
quite overwhelming ones.49 Significantly, however, at most these
arguments justify abolishing Fifth Amendment "fruits" exclusion;
they do not justify Amar's (over)compensating Miranda expan-
sion on the other side of the ledger-which has more the feel of an
appeasing bone thrown to the potentially offended liberal crimi-
nal procedure establishment than of genuine textual, historical,
or structural constitutional analysis. What really seems to drive
Amar's analysis on the stationhouse interrogation issue is his big-
picture notion that the way to rationalize the privilege is to take
one strand from its several, tangled historical justifications and
weave it into the central animating principle behind the privi-
lege. That principle, for Amar, is a central concern with the unre-
liability of compelled testimonial statements (but not derivative
evidentiary fruits).
"For example, as a textual matter: The idea of being a "witness" plausibly could
mean, in both the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment context, any person who pres-
ents testimony orphysical evidence under oath to ajudicial tribunal (or whose earlier such
sworn representations are subsequently introduced in court). "Witnessing" might well in-
volve more than simply testimonial communications. Wigmore and others thought that
the difference between "furnish evidence against himself" and "be a witness against him-
self' were not substantive but stylistic. (Amar, whose treatment of evidence adverse to his
thesis is very fair, acknowledges this fact, at p 227 n 247.) It thus could be that the state
constitutional language is evidence of the probable intended meaning and scope of the fed-
eral constitutional language, rather than a sharp contrast to it. See Michael W. McCon-
nell, The Origins and Historical Meaning of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev
1416, 1455-66 (1990) (employing the latter methodology to explicate the probable meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause, which uses more spare language than its state constitutional
prototypes). Amar's discussion does not decisively repudiate this possibility.
As for precedent, the Schmerber line is plausibly distinguishable on the ground that
the evidentiary "f uits" of bodily samples, physical identity, and voice and handwriting ex-
emplars never involve any compelled testimonial communication; evidentiary fruits de-
rived from compelled statements do.
Finally, it is entirely plausible that the Fifth Amendment privilege simply does not co-
here well with the accused's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses--that the Fifth Amendment privilege is at odds with the constitutional system's
usual concern for truth-seeking and the protection of innocence. (Indeed, this is the hy-
pothesis I will advance below: the Fifth Amendment privilege is a constitutional anomaly
that does not cohere well with the usual goals of the criminal justice system and with
other constitutional protections for the accused, and that it imposes unjustified costs on
legitimate law enforcement.)
In noting the possible counterarguments to Amar's points, I am not saying that
Amar's conclusion is necessarily wrong on the admissibility of use-fruits. I remain uncer-
tain on this question, and I have no answer to his historical argument that testimonial
immunity was the universally accepted American rule prior to Counselman. My point here
is simply that Amars textual and structural arguments seem more vulnerable here than
in his Fourth and Sixth Amendment arguments, and that this vulnerability should leave
open the possibility of a yet better "constructivist coherence" understanding of the Fifth
Amendment, of which Amar's use-fruits thesis might or might not be a component. See
note 24 for a discussion of "constructivist coherence."
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This is a dubious move-sharing much in common with the
"atextual-historical-principle-level-of-abstraction-manipulation"
problem for which I have criticized Amar's Fourth Amendment
critics."0 And it is in large measure a move unnecessary to Amar's
thesis, except as an attempt to make the Fifth Amendment co-
here more neatly with Sixth Amendment first principles and to
justify Miranda (and Miranda-plus) and Griffin v California's no-
comment-on-silence rule. On Amar's reading, Miranda is about
the unreliability of incriminating statements produced by unsu-
pervised stationhouse interrogation. Griffin is rightly decided be-
cause an adverse inference of guilt from failure to testify is, to
Amar, unreliable; it could end up punishing those who wish not to
take the stand because they are inarticulate, or because they
might be made (falsely) to look guilty, or because of prior convic-
tions or other misconduct (pp 73-74). By way of contrast, Amar
argues, physical evidence-however derived-is reliable stuff. A
reliability principle thus buttresses the bright line between tes-
timonial communications and use-fruits that Amar draws from
his textual and structural analysis.
As others have argued, this move to a general principle of
"reliability" truly is based on a somewhat selective reading of the
history. 1 Amar is honest about this, though, and is careful not to
overstate his historical case. He freely acknowledges the "com-
plexity and uncertainty" of the historical rationale for the privi-
lege (p 68). His argument is simply that this is the only one of the
historically obscure rationales that can coherently justify the
presence of the Fifth Amendment privilege within the broader
constitutional scheme. In short, "reliability" is the only principle
that makes sense of the privilege today.
There are some coherency problems even with this view,
however. Most notably, it does not satisfactorily explain why,
once a compelled statement has led to physical evidentiary fruits,
the statements leading to the fruits cannot themselves be admit-
ted. After all, they have been proven reliable in at least that re-
spect. In the Dirty Harry scenario, for example, if you can admit
the body that Scorpio told Harry where to find, why can't you
admit what Scorpio told Harry about where he could find the
body? Certainly that much at least, was deadly reliable. Amar's
one paragraph footnoted response is uncharacteristically weak:
"Nor are reliability concerns always cured by a physical corrobo-
See note 25 and accompanying text.
s See Alschuler, 94 Mich L Rev at 2638 (cited in note 16); Dripps, 74 NC L Rev at
1624 (cited in note 17).
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ration test, because many confessions may concern internal men-
tal states, where misunderstandings are quite likely" (p 228 n
265). In the end, Amar shrugs: "We need not say every coerced
statement is unreliable, or every physical fact reliable; the Fifth
Amendment lays down a bright-line rule, and as with any rule
the rationale need not explain every instance of the rule's appli-
cation" (p 85).
Fair enough. But I submit that, even on Amar's own terms,
there is an alternative reading of the Fifth Amendment privilege
that makes even better sense of the text and of the history-even
as presented by Amar-than Amar's own synthesis: The Fifth
Amendment provides a privilege against compulsory judicial pro-
cess to present sworn testimony against oneself for use in a crimi-
nal case.
Start with the text. Amar's holistic textual argument tying
together the word "witness" as used in the Sixth and the Fifth
Amendments can be done one better: The Fifth says that "No per-
son... shall be compelled.., to be a witness against himself" and
the Sixth, with striking parallelism, says that the accused has
the right to "have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor." Placed side by side, the inference is nearly inescap-
able: The compulsion referred to in the Fifth Amendment is the
same as that referenced by the Compulsory Process Clause-
compulsory judicial process, backed by the power of contempt and
on pain of perjury for falsity. It means compulsion by force of law.
It does not mean extra-legal coercion by government agents
acting under color of law, but without actual authority to impose
lawful punishment for refusal to speak. (That is another species
of problem, sounding in both the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures" of "persons"
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibitions of
deprivation of "liberty... without due process of law." The law
should supply a remedy for such violations, but it should be
Amar's remedial scheme for constitutional torts: compensatory
and punitive damages, and perhaps injunctive relief.)
Thus, Miranda is wrong for the simple reason that custodial
interrogation, not commanded by judicial process, with the sus-
pect unsworn, simply falls outside the ambit of the Fifth Amend-
ment's prohibition of legal compulsion "to be a witness." Dirty
Harry can beat suspects all he wants, without Fifth Amendment
consequence. Not only do reliable physical evidentiary fruits come
in (Amar's world), but the statements themselves come in too, if
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they otherwise satisfy evidentiary standards for reliability.52 The
fruits come in on the straightforward theory that there has been
no Fifth Amendment violation at all, not on Amar's trickier
proposition that the amendment is violated by introduction of the
incriminating statements but not by introduction of the fruits of
such statements.
Griffin is wrong too, on this reading of the word "compelled"
as referring to compulsory judicial process. The privilege is vio-
lated if (and only if) judicial process compels the defendant to tes-
tify against himself or else go to jail for contempt. But it does not
follow that permitting the prosecutor to comment on a defen-
dant's choice not to testify, and permitting the trier of fact to
draw reasonable inferences therefrom, is compulsory process re-
quiring the defendant to be a witness. As noted, Amar defends
Griffin, weakly, on quasi-reliability grounds, arguing that it
might lead to erroneous conviction of innocent but unpersuasive
defendants who feel they need to take the stand in order to avoid
looking guilty (pp 73-74). Once again, however, "reliability" here
seems to be a sometimes-yes, sometimes-no, "more-prejudicial-
than-probative" evidence law question dressed up as a rule of
constitutional law.5" Without Amar's view of the privilege as cen-
trally concerned with reliability, read back into the text as if
stated therein as a rule, the Court's decision in Griffin is left with
nothing in the text to support it. 4
' On this reading, "reliability" is not a constitutional mandate flowing from the Fifth
Amendment, but a rule of evidence. It may well be that a coerced confession is not reliable
and should therefore be excluded from evidence on the ground that it is more prejudicial
than probative, see FRE 403, but that is different from saying that the Fifth Amendment
requires exclusion as a flat rule. Amar makes this precise point in the Sixth Amendment
context: Hearsay might be excluded as a common law rule of evidence, because it is (some-
times) unreliable, but that does not mean that the hearsay rule is constitutionalized by
the Confrontation Clause (p 131).
See note 52.
Griffin is a particularly weak context in which to make an "unconstitutional condi-
tions" type of argument, though that is what Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court tried
to do. Comment on silence, Douglas wrote, "is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." Grif-
fin, 380 US at 614. But adverse comment and adverse inference are penalties on the
privilege only if the privilege itself entails a further right that the accused's refusal to tes-
tify not be the subject of comment or inference-which begs the question-in-chief.
Griffin is thus not at all like genuine unconstitutional conditions cases, where gov-
ernment "condition[s] one legal right, benefit, or privilege on the abandonment of another
legal right, benefit, or privilege, the relinquishment of which the government would not
have authority to command directly, unless the condition is directly germane to (in the
sense of being practically inseparable from) the nature of the right or benefit itself." Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum:
Unconstitutional Conditions on 'Equal Access" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 UC
Davis L Rev 653, 664-65 (1996). What is the legal right or privilege a defendant is re-
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I would not go so far as to say that my "compulsory judicial
process" reading of the text is an unavoidable reading of the
words themselves; other readings seem to be within the range of
plausible understanding of the text. The insight into the meaning
of what constitutes "compelled" testimony is a whole-text struc-
tural argument drawing on the Sixth Amendment to explicate the
probable contextual meaning of "compelled," not an ineluctably
"plain" meaning of the word itself. But this reading does cohere
nicely with the words of the text, taken in context, and under-
stood coherently across similar constitutional provisions. It is, in
short, a textual argument much like Amar's, but one that makes
better overall sense of the word "compelled."
Moreover, this reading of the text is strongly reinforced by a
consideration of the relevant history-the next rung in Amar's in-
terpretive hierarchy. In fact, the compulsory judicial process
reading coheres far better with the tangled history as recounted
by Amar than does Amar's own synthesis. Professor Albert Al-
schuler puts it this way in his recent and comprehensive review
of the privilege's historical origins:
The history of the privilege, from the struggles over the
authority of the High Commission through at least the
framing of the American Bill of Rights, is almost entirely a
story of when and for what purposes people would be re-
quired to speak under oath.55
It is no exaggeration to say that all of the history presented and
discussed by Alschuler (and by Amar) is consistent with the
reading of the clause as limited to compulsory legal process.56
The privilege is, moreover, something of an anachronism. It
was designed, in all probability, to serve interests thought quite
compelling at the time but regarded less highly today: (1) sparing
a guilty defendant from the enormous temptation to lie under
oath and, consequently, suffer eternal damnation in the fires of
quired to relinquish as a consequence of invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege? Is it the
"right" not to have a probative adverse inference drawn from his failure to take the stand
and testify? If so, the easy response is that that is not an independent constitutional or
other legal entitlement; it only exists if the Fifth Amendment itself creates such an enti-
tlement, and nothing in the text or history of the privilege supports such a conclusion.
Alschuler, 94 Mich L Rev at 2641-42 (cited in note 16).
Even the concern with torture appears to have been directed at historical practices
where torture was used as legal process. Id at 2651 & n 95. While all of Alschuler's histori-
cal analysis supports my conclusion here, I should note that Alschuler does not embrace
this conclusion himself, because he is not a textualist or an originalist. See id at 2667. For
a series of historical approaches, including a revised version of Alschuler's essay, see gen-




hell; and, somewhat relatedly, (2) protecting the system from de-
ception by the perjury that might well be expected under such
circumstances. As Amar and others have noted, oaths and extra-
temporal consequences for lying were taken very seriously indeed
by the founding generation.7 To be sure, the reliability strand is
present in the history too, but the more central reliability concern
giving rise to the privilege was the fear that guilty defendants
would commit perjury, not that innocent defendants would be
wrongfully convicted. As Amar notes, for example, defendants
were disqualified at the time from testifying at all, basically be-
cause their testimony could not be trusted (p 66).
It is hard for the modern mind to get inside the heads of typi-
cal eighteenth century Americans, but it appears from the his-
torical evidence, embraced by both Alschuler and Amar, that the
following type of thinking would have been common: Most people
swearing an oath to God to testify truthfully will do so, lest they
suffer eternal damnation. A criminal defendant on trial for his
life is subject to the same principle, but might succumb to the
temptation to lie. The law should not lead the defendant into this
temptation; to do so would be cruel and risk imposing far greater
punishment on the defendant (eternal damnation of his soul)
than that warranted by his crime (mere loss of life, limb, or lib-
erty), merely because of his (already evident) moral weakness.
See p 73 ("Those who framed the Fifth Amendment... believed that perjury was a
mortal sin, resulting in eternal damnation: better to admit murder than commit perjury
under oath. The power of oaths several centuries ago is abundantly clear from the Consti-
tution itself, which requires oaths in several of its most important provisions, and from
landmark opinions of the Marshall Court stressing oaths.") (footnotes omitted). See also
Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich L Rev 71, 86-87, 90-91, 100, 111,
147 (1974); Alschuler, 94 Mich L Rev at 2645 (cited in note 16). See, for example, Justice
Jacob Rush, The Nature and Importance of an Oath--the Charge to a Jury (1796), re-
printed in Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds, 2 American Political Writing
During the Founding Era: 1760-1805 1015 (Liberty 1983) ("An oath, gentlemen, is a very
serious transaction, and may be defined, a solemn appeal to God for the truth of the facts
asserted by the witness, with an imprecation of the divine justice upon him, if the facts
which he relates are false; or in the case of a promissory oath, if the party doth not fulfil
his engagement.").
The historical importance of oaths is relevant to the proper understanding of other
constitutional provisions as well. Professor McConnell, in discussing the issue of exemp-
tion of Quakers from the requirement of oath taking, has noted the importance of such
oaths. McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1467 (cited in note 49) ("At a time when perjury
prosecutions were unusual, extratemporal sanctions for telling falsehoods or reneging on
commitments were thought indispensable to civil society."). In another context, I have re-
lied heavily on the sanctity of oaths as an argument supporting coordinate legal review by
each of the three branches of the federal government of the acts of the others. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83
Georgetown L J 217, 257-62 (1994).
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Thus the Fifth Amendment privilege. 5 Indeed, the same line of
eighteenth century thinking would go, the law should not even al-
low the criminal defendant to testify (thus the common law dis-
qualification of the accused), because the incentives to peijury are
so great. Moreover, the capacity of such peijured testimony to
mislead the trier of fact is also great (because testimony under
sworn oath is likely to be believed), which would lead to--here we
have Amar's point, modified-unreliable outcomes.59
As Alschuler writes, "[i]f this understanding of the original
understanding is correct, critics of the Fifth Amendment privilege
have missed the mark. Although the intensity of the framers' dis-
approval of sworn statements by suspects may seem foreign to us
today, the policies that informed the privilege were coherent and
compelling ... "60 Indeed, Alschuler concludes that the original
understanding distinguished sharply between unsworn and
sworn statements, and that fidelity to this understanding would
mean that both Miranda and Griffin should be overruled.
The eighteenth century rationale for the privilege is no
longer fashionable or even very comprehensible to most people
today, however, and neither Alschuler nor (more surprisingly)
Amar embraces it. Oaths are taken less seriously today (if they
are taken seriously at all), fewer people believe in hell, and an
oath is no longer thought to be effective because of extratemporal
' It is also true, as Amar and others note, that the privilege protected against thought
crimes like religious heresy, but that cannot account for all of its scope, historically, nor
for its presence in a Bill of Rights with a Free Speech Clause, a Free Exercise Clause, and
an Establishment Clause. See p 66.
' The real issue in Griffin is what should be the result when the common law dis-
qualification is removed and all that is left is the privilege not to testify. Is it fair to com-
ment on the defendanfs decision not to testify? In the framers' world, the decision not to
testify, under these circumstances, would send a strong signal: the defendant is guilty, but
has a conscience unwilling to risk the fires of hell for testifying perjuriously. To a lesser
extent, in today's world one might draw the same inference (but for the mitigating effects
of familiarity with the privilege and with Miranda). One could argue that the privilege
makes less sense without the general testimonial disqualification and that it is unfair to
allow a practice today that would not have been thought proper at the time the privilege
was adopted. The better argument, though, is that the Fifth Amendment privilege plainly
does not constitutionalize the common law disqualification, so that the privilege survives
the abandonment of that disqualification. This does not, however, justify us in changing
the meaning of the surviving constitutional privilege. It means that the privilege set forth
in the text is, in this respect as in others, an anachronism.
I should also note at this point that, if the privilege is indeed centrally concerned with
avoiding the temptations to perjury under oath, this casts further doubt on Amar's bright
line between testimony and use-fruits, for it seems inescapable that the incentive to lie
will remain where a defendant, compelled to testify under oath, will have any physical
evidence thereby obtained introduced against him. If the "point" (or a large part of the
point) of the privilege, historically, is to spare the defendant this dilemma, Amar's solution
does not cohere with that strand of history.
Alschuler, 94 Mich L Rev at 2652 (cited in note 16).
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consequences for false swearing. The only real bite behind an
oath is the specter of a peijury prosecution, and peijury is notori-
ously difficult to prove. As Alschuler writes, "[tihe fires of hell
have smoldered. Oaths have lost their terror and even their
meaning.""' Indeed, the ethos of today is that pejury is common-
place-almost expected and tolerated, it seems-from criminal
defendants.62 Some would go so far as to suggest that the defen-
dant has a constitutional right to testify that necessarily includes
a right to testify pejuriously.6 ' We have come a long way since
the eighteenth century, not all of it in a positive direction.
In light of these changes in common thinking, Alschuler
throws up his hands: "In a very different world from that of the
early American republic, restoring the original understanding of
the Fifth Amendment privilege is impossible."' This is disap-
pointing. It is a cardinal mistake of constitutional interpretation,
conceived of as the task of explicating a provision's meaning
rather than seeking its improvement, to abandon the text, his-
tory, and structure of the constitutional privilege in order to cre-
ate a new or improved one.65
I fear that Amar, uncharacteristically, has fallen into this
trap too. He very badly wants to make modern policy sense out of
the Fifth Amendment privilege, to harmonize it with the princi-
ples of the Sixth Amendment, and to rationalize it so that it is
1 Id at 2667.
See id at 2667-71 & nn 176, 177. See also id at 2671 & n 177 (urging that defendants
be permitted to testify under oath or not, and without the threat of perjury); William J.
Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 Colun L Rev 1227, 1229 (1988) (Fifth Amend-
ment privilege should be understood as protecting silence in situations where "excusable
perjury" might otherwise be expected.).
' See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Law-
yer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich L Rev 1469 (1966). Amar rightly criticizes this
ethos and its horrid implications for legal "ethics" (pp 141-44).
Alschuler, 94 Mich L Rev at 2667 (cited in note 16).
Gary Lawson has put this point nicely, in a different constitutional context. Imagine
that we adopted an entirely new constitution, so that our present one became merely a
historical artifact, the meaning of which had no real-world consequences (much like the
Articles of Confederation). How would we ascertain the meaning of this old (but now ir-
relevant) document other than by looking at its text (understood in accordance with the
rules of language employed at the time), evidence of its original understanding and pur-
poses, and its internal structure and logic? Like Lawson, I suspect that this method is not
followed today "only because its descriptive interpretative conclusions are widely thought
to have prescriptive adjudicative consequences" thought to be undesirable. Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv L Rev 1231, 1250 n 101 (1994).
This is unquestionably true for the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privilege, under-
stood in accordance with its text and history, is not a very sensible thing to have around
these days, as nearly all commentators appear to agree. See Dripps, 74 NC L Rev at 1564
(cited in note 17); Alschuler, 94 Mich L Rev at 2667-71 (cited in note 16); Stuntz, 88 Colum
L Rev at 1232-42 (cited in note 62).
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something we can be proud to have in our Constitution, rather
than be embarrassed by its anachronistic and seemingly pro-
criminal nature. The goal is noble, but the product falls short.
Such a method reads text and history in light of a desire to reach
sensible outcomes. In other words, it inverts Amar's usual inter-
pretive hierarchy and ignores the possibility that text and history
do not support good policy. Maybe the Fifth Amendment privilege
is simply a bad privilege, or at least one that no longer makes
sense in a world without testimonial disqualification of the ac-
cused. Maybe the Fifth Amendment privilege is in some tension
with the Compulsory Process clause, in that it requires either a
regrettable immunity bath for a witness invoking the privilege (to
some extent or another) or a violation of the apparent plain
meaning of the right to compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses. But that just reinforces the idea that the privilege is a
bad privilege.66 Maybe the Fifth Amendment is, at some level,
about (limited) protection of guilty bad guys, not about innocent
good guys, and thus has more in common with Eighth Amend-
ment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment (it's pretty
cruel for the government to pave the accused's road to hell) than
with Sixth Amendment protections for the innocent accused. Or
maybe it is just a constitutional anomaly.
In short, Amar's reading perhaps searches too hard for co-
herency and an attractive general principle where none exists,
and this worthy effort causes him to discard too much contrary
textual and historical analysis. 7 Amar's bright line between tes-
timonial communications and derivative evidentiary fruits may
yet be right; I view Amar as having legitimately reopened that
' There are possible alternative harmonizations, however, which I set forth here
merely in the form of hypotheses: It is possible that the right of an accused to compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses "in his favor" simply was not contemplated at the time as
applying in a co-conspirator or co-defendant context (when both indicted conspirators
would be disqualified from testifying anyway). Alternatively, sans disqualification and
sans Griffin, maybe the dissonance between the two amendments is lessened by the abil-
ity of Defendant One to take the stand, testify truthfully, and argue to the jury the infer-
ence of guilt from Defendant Two's refusal to be sworn. Neither of these answers strikes
me as entirely satisfactory, though both would seem consonant with the historical original
understanding. A third alternative is that Amar is right about the scope of the immunity
that must be granted in exchange for compelling testimony-testimonial use immunity
but not use-fruits immunity-but that his general theory of the Fifth Amendment as being
concerned about reliability is unnecessary to this conclusion and unsound in its other ap-
plications.
In this regard, the last line of Amar's Fifth Amendment chapter is revealing: "A le-
gal system that ignores the truth is simply not doing its job, and neither is a court that
cannot make the Constitution cohere" (p 88). I would counter: A constitutional privilege
that thwarts the truth is not a very good privilege and should be duly repealed, but a court
lacks legitimate authority to make it "cohere" by rewriting it.
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question, within the scope of the privilege's limited domain (that
is, where there has been compelled sworn testimony by dint of
formal legal process). But he has missed the textual and histori-
cal evidence for that very limited domain, causing him to run in
the wrong direction on Miranda and Griffin. And that is a signifi-
cant shortcoming in his synthesis. The Fifth Amendment privi-
lege may be a bad idea, an historical anachronism, and an unde-
served protection of guilt. But limited to its proper domain, it is
an ugly constitutional provision we can live with.
V. EPILOGUE
Dirty Harry eventually got his man-with a .44 magnum, not
the law. The law was crazy, and it still is. Akhil Amar's book is a
sustained intellectual argument for reconsideration of what has
been done by "the law" (that is, the courts) in the name of the
Constitution. It is an argument that needs, and deserves, to be
taken seriously. It is time to put the Constitution-the real Con-
stitution-back into "constitutional criminal procedure." Only
then will Inspector Callaghan get a satisfactory answer to his
questions:
What about Ann Mary Deacon? What about her rights [and
the rights of innumerable other victims of crime]? ... Who
speaks for her?
The answer is that the Constitution speaks for her, and for all of
us, if only we will let it.
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